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CONCURRENT PROXIMATE CAUSES IN INSURANCE
DISPUTES: AFTER GARVEY, WHAT WILL
POLICYHOLDERS EXPECT?
•I. INTRODUCTION
Insurance serves an increasingly important function in society.
The type and amount of insurance one obtains for protection of
property and person will substantially affect one's ability to compen-
sate adequately for unexpected loss. When losses do occur, the poli-
cyholder' expects to be compensated by the insurer2 when the type of
loss incurred falls within the scope of the provisions of his or her
policy.
Difficulties in settling cases arise where concurrent s or joint'
proximate causes contribute to the insured's damage, but where one
of the causes of the damage is specifically "excluded" under the in-
sured's policy and another is "covered" under the insured's policy.
The insurer often refuses to compensate for any of the loss because
one of the causes of the damage is specifically excluded. Conversely,
the insured insists on coverage because one of the causes of the loss
was covered under the policy.
The problem is further exacerbated when the insured holds an
© 1989 by Mark Y. Umeda
1. A "policyholder" is defined as "[tihe person who owns the policy of insurance
whether he is the insured or not. In most states, any person with an insurable interest may be
a policyholder." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979). For the purposes.of this
Comment, the terms "policyholder" and "insured" will be used only in reference to those
persons eligible for coverage under the specified policy, not to any other beneficiaries.
2. An "insurer" is defined as "the underwriter or insurance company with whom a
contract of insurance is made. The one who assumes risk or underwrites a policy, or the
underwriter or company with whom a contract of insurance is made." Id. at 726. See also
National Sec., Inc. v. Johnson, 14 Ariz. App. 31, 31, 480 P.2d 368, 370 (1971).
3. "Concurrent causes" are defined as:
[clauses acting contemporeaneously and together causing injury, which would
not have resulted in absence of either. Two distinct causes operating at the same
time to produce a given result, which might be produced by either, are 'concur-
rent causes'; but two distinct causes, successive and unrelated in an operation,
cannot be concurring, and one will be regarded as the proximate and efficient
and responsible cause, and the other will be regarded as the remote cause.
BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 263.
4. "Joint causes" contribute jointly to the total damage, but do not occur simultaneously.
Joint causes are successive and related to one another.
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"all-risk" policy, a policy written to cover all risks,5 although none
are explicitly mentioned. A risk is covered as long as it is not specifi-
cally excluded by the policy.6 In other words, theoretically, any risk
not specifically excluded will be covered by the insurer.7
Consider this scenario: A family pays premiums on an "all-
risk" insurance policy that specifically excludes coverage for damage
done by floods. Heavy rains cause a flooding of the community and
destroy the family's home. Clearly, at this point, the family has no
coverage because the cause of the damage is specifically excluded.
However, suppose the community rests at the end of a massive tribu-
tary system. These waterways culminate at the edge of this commu-
nity, where the water ultimately flows into the ocean through flood-
gates that allow the water to escape during low tides. Suppose,
further, that the municipality responsible for maintaining the flood-
gates has disregarded its duty of maintenance. On a particular occa-
sion, the floodgates were not opened to release the water flowing
toward the community. If the municipality's negligence was factually
proven by a separate action against that municipality, the injured
family could request coverage on the grounds that third-party negli-
gence was included in their policy because it was not specifically
excluded. The question to be resolved is whether the insured should
be covered.
The California Legislature has not addressed this problem, so
5. For the purposes of insurance law, a "risk" is defined as:
the danger or hazard of a loss of the property insured; the casualty contemplated
in a contract of insurance; the degree of hazard; a specified contingency or peril;
and, colloquially, the specific house, factory, ship, etc., covered by the policy.
Hazard, danger, peril, exposure to loss, injury, disadvantage or destruction,
comprise all elements of danger.
BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 1193. See also Knox Jewelry Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 130 Ga.
App. 519, 519, 203 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1974).
6. W. KEETON, KEETON ON INSURANCE LAW § 5.1(b), 269-70 (1971).
7. Id. Some policyholders have had increasing difficulty dealing with insurance compa-
nies, who are often perceived as wealthy corporations that simply raise their premiums to
make more money. Indeed, the public perceives insurance premiums as unreasonably excessive,
evidenced by the numerous insurance initiatives designed to reduce insurance premiums for
good driving, to eliminate the antitrust exemption previously possessed by the the insurance
industry, and to increase funding to monitor the insurance industry's claims practices. These
perceptions culminated in the passage of Proposition 103, which eliminated the antitrust ex-
emption and could eventually reduce premiums for all policyholders.
Whether Proposition 103 is conducive to the well-being of the insurance industry remains
to be seen. Many insurance companies have stated that they will not survive if the new Pro-
position applies to them. Furthermore, several of the larger insurers, such as State Farm, have
stated that they will not underwrite new auto policies in California because of the excessive
cost created by Proposition 103. San Francisco Chronicle, Nov. 10, 1988, at 1, col. 1, and 24,
col. S.
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insurance companies and policyholders have relied on case law to
resolve disputes.8
In 1986, the California Court of Appeals for the First District
attempted to answer this question in Garvey v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co.9 The test handed down in that case is a unique and
perhaps troubling one for future insurance cases, and its impact may
be far-reaching. The Garvey court assembled a collection of insur-
ance law doctrines and shaped them into a test to be used in deter-
mining whether a policy covers loss in this multiple cause situation.1"
The Garvey court ruled that when a covered risk and an excluded
risk are both proven to be causes in fact of an injury, and the two
risks are independent of one another, the loss is covered only if the
covered risk was a concurring proximate cause of the loss.11 How-
ever, if the two risks depended upon one another in causing the dam-
age, then the insured would only be covered fully if the jury decided
that the covered risk was the moving or primary cause of the dam-
8. The California Insurance Code contains no such provisions at this time. Present code
sections provide for either excluded risks or covered risks. No specific code section provides for
situations in which concurrent or joint causes of damage are present. For example, California
Insurance Code § 530 provides:
An insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the proxi-
mate cause, although a peril not contemplated by the contract may have been a
remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured
against was only a remote cause.
CAL. INS. CODE § 530 (West 1972). In like manner, California Insurance Code § 532
provides:
If a peril is specially excepted in a contract of insurance and there is a loss
which would not have occurred but for such peril, such loss is thereby excepted
even though the immediate cause of the loss was a peril which was not excepted.
Id. § 532.
9. 181 Cal. App. 3d 929, 227 Cal. Rptr. 209, rev. granted, reprinted for tracking
pending review, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1248, reprinted for tracking pending review, 201 Cal. App.
3d 1174 (1986). After over two years of pending review, the California Supreme Court has
finally ruled on the court of appeals decision in Garvey. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d 395, 770 P.2d 704,
257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989). The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals decision,.but
made some modifications to the newly-formed Garvey test. It held that Partridge should only
be used in liability cases, in which true concurrent causes, each originating from an in-
dependant act of negligence, simultaneously join togeather to produce injury, thus, taking away
the first prong of the court of appeals test. Id. at 412, 770 P.2d at 714, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
Justice Mosk's dissent argued that although the policy under consideration in Partridge
happened to provide liability insurance, the court's discussion did not suggest that the analysis
is or should be limited to such policies because the court cited both first and third party deci-
sions and that no reported decision has ever been found to limit Partridge's application. He
also argued that there could not be different analysis of concurrent causation because some
policies are first party and some are third party. Id. at 416, 770 P.2d at 717, 257 Cal. Rptr. at
305.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 935-37, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 215-18.
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age. 2 Garvey marks a new trend in insurance contract causation
analysis. Therefore, the case should be examined for its social impact
and rationale.
This comment will discuss the history of concurrent proximate
causes in the realm of insurance law and the tests traditionally used
in determining coverage. Also, this comment will discuss whether
deference should be given to the insured by virtue of the contractual
nature of the insurance policy and whether a tort proximate cause
analysis should be used in an insurance contract analysis. Further,
this comment will analyze the Garvey case specifically and determine
its validity and impact on insurance law. Finally, the recommended
proposal will address how a court might make a determination as to
whether full, zero, or partial coverage should be given to the insured
in these situations.
II. BACKGROUND
The realm of insurance law is difficult and complex. This com-
plexity is due, in part, to the nature and structure of insurance poli-
cies and the substance of legal actions brought when a dispute arises
between an insurer and an insured.
A. Adhesion Contracts
Insurance contracts are not ordinary contracts." They are con-
sidered adhesion contracts." An adhesion contract is normally a
printed form contract used for numerous insureds who are unable to
alter its terms and whose bargaining position is inferior to that of the
drafter.' 5 Ordinary contracts imply an arm's length transaction be-
12. Id. at 939-40, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 219-20.
13. A "contract" is defined as "lain agreement between two or more persons which
creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. Its essential elements include compe-
tent parties, subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement and mutuality of
obligation." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 291-92. For a further discussion of the definition of a
contract, see also 1 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1 (3d ed.
1957) ("A contract is a promise, or set of promises, for breach of which the law gives a
remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 3 (Tent. Draft 1980) ("An agreement is a manifestation of
mutual assent on the part of two or more persons."); 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
3 (1963) ("a contract is a promise enforceable at law directly or indirectly").
14. Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light of the Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction,
5 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1972). See also J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 336 (2d ed.
1977).
15. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. Note that although some insurance com-
panies demand that one "adhere" to their set provisions, other companies allow negotiation
concerning policy terms. However, the potential insured has no knowledge that such negotia-
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tween two parties with equal bargaining power that results in an
agreement with beneficial provisions for both parties.16 In essence,
the important element in an ordinary contract is the ability to bar-
gain freely and to choose the provisions to be included and those to
be excluded."7 Of course, some desired benefits will not be realized
through the contract by either party, since the bargaining process
implies an adequate amount of compromise. Ultimately, both parties
have the option to refuse to enter into the contract if the provisions
are not well suited to their needs.
However, in areas such as insurance law, where numerous con-
tracts must be signed and implemented, the general practice has been
to develop "standard form" contracts. 8 This effort by insurance
companies to standardize insurance contracts follows three lines of
rationale.
First, in order to meet the demand for insurance coverage, in-
surance companies have had to standardize their policies. Conse-
quently, the bargaining process between a particular insurer and a
potential insured remains minimal or nonexistent."' Otherwise, po-
tential insureds would bargain for every desired protection, while the
insurer would seek to exclude as much as possible. Individual bar-
gaining would be costly and time consuming for both parties.2 0
Second, by standardizing policies, coverage becomes more pre-
dictable to both parties. To the insurer, predictable coverage means
that risk situations will be easily distinguishable in determining cov-
erage.' Since the insurer drafted the policy and standardized the
policy provisions, he will be better able to measure and allocate risk.
For the insured, predictable coverage allows a determination of pre-
cisely those situations protected under each policy so that the insured
can purchase additional insurance to fill any gaps in the present cov-
erage. Standardized policies, in effect, enable the insured to decide
which insurance policies to purchase, without spending needless time
tion is possible. Thus, it can be argued that this is also a form of "adhesion."
16. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
17. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (Tent. Draft 1980). Indeed, "Stan-
dard-Form" contracts result in less cost to both insurer and insured, assuming that no disputes
arise from those contracts.
19. Bolgar, The Contract of Adhesion: A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20 AM.
J. COMP. L. 53 (1972).
20. This author notes that it is an insurer's refusal to negotiate terms that could consti-
tute "adhesion" because both parties want the process to be as expedient as possible.
21. This author feels that the "adhesive" nature of the contract has less of an impact if
one feels there is an optimum policy in the vast realm of insurance policies from which to
choose.
1989]
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negotiating each provision.22
Third, although standardized insurance contracts can benefit
both parties, the insurer gains considerable advantages over the in-
sured. The mere fact that the insurer drafts the policy, without nego-
tiation, gives the insurer the power to control the types of provisions
available and to offer the policy on a "take it or leave it" basis.
Many insureds, who lack the time to negotiate, will be forced to
choose the "best" policy available.2"
Consequently, insureds are left with some provisions in their
policy that are undesirable or even detrimental to their interests, but
they must "adhere" to these terms because this policy is the "best"
they can find. Ordinarily, parties who voluntarily sign agreements
without full knowledge of their terms are considered to have as-
sumed the risk that they have entered into a one-sided bargain.
However, the insured with little or no bargaining power is not held
to the same rules as one who is bound by a non-adhesionary con-
tract." ' This is the nature of an adhesion contract.
True assent does not exist in adhesion contracts unless there is a
genuine opportunity to accept or reject any particular clause.25 This,
in reality, never occurs. To assert that an insured is bound by provi-
sions not agreed to gives a powerful advantage to an insurance com-
pany that includes certain undesirable provisions without losing the
general appeal of the policy. Moreover, to treat insureds as alert,
informed parties, mindful of their self-interest and able to defend it,
is to ignore the reality of insurance transactions. 6 Indeed, exclusions
in insurance contracts, which insurers apply unilaterally and which
insureds are often unaware of, give the clearest example of the dan-
gers inherent in adhesion contracts,27 and courts increasingly require
the party seeking to enforce the adhesion contract to carry the bur-
den of showing that its provisions were explained to the other and
22. Ultimately, it could be less costly overall to negotiate one large policy, so an insured
would not require separate policies for home, auto, fire, theft, and the like.
23. Bolgar, surpa note 19, at 55.
24. This author strongly suggests that the word "voluntary" is crucial, for if the contract
is not signed voluntarily, it is not binding. There is a fine line here, however, for rarely will a
contract be signed in which both parties actually have equal bargaining power and the terms
are fair as to each party. One party always has at least a slight advantage.
25. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 14, at 346.
26. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 14, at 346. Insureds want to find the
"best" policy, but are often fearful that insurance companies will refuse to pay, forcing the
insured into a costly legal battle with a major corporation.
27. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Estate of Sterling Meyer, 192 Cal. App. 3d
866, 237 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1987); Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomenon, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1982).
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that there was a real and voluntary meeting of the minds.2"
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, now recognized and ac-
cepted in most definitions of adhesion contracts, urges that an adhe-
sion contract is unconscionable if a reasonable person would not have
expected to find such a clause in the contract. 9 Such a clause is
considered to be oppressive, unfair, or indecent. This determination
is made by the courts, who must consider the essential fairness of the
printed terms, both from the viewpoint of surprise to the insured and
an inherent, one-sidedness for the insurer. Thus, because of unequal
bargaining power in adhesion contracts, insurance law has given def-
erence to the insured, requiring that any and all ambiguities be con-
strued in favor of the reasonable expectations of the insured. 0
B. "All-Risk" Policies
An "all-risk" policy is essentially a term of art."1 Its usage does
not imply that every potential risk will be covered, regardless of the
circumstances.3" This type of policy usually states that it will cover
all risks, with exceptions clearly specified; that is, no risks included
within coverage are specified, only those risks that are excluded.33
Presumably, this type of policy is designed by insurers to give in-
sureds blanket coverage, so that insureds can attempt to avoid gaps
in coverage otherwise present in separately purchased, individual
policies.34 The policy is also a reflection of the insurer's ability to
draft a policy that boldly clarifies the risks to be excluded. 8 This is
28. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 14, at 336-40. See also, Weaver v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971). But see Lawrence v. Western Mutual Ins.
Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1988) holding that an insurer is under no
obligation to explain to the insured all possible legal theories of recovery under an insurance
policy although the terms of a policy must fairly and accurately explain the covered risks.
In Lawrence, the insured was unaware that third party negligence was covered under his
policy, although earth movement damage was excluded. These facts are substantially similar to
those of Garvey.
29. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 14, at 344-45.
30. See infra notes 42-54 and accompanying text.
31. W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 269-70.
32. W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 270-71. The term "all-risk" encompasses miscellane-
ous risks in addition to the traditionally insured risks such as fire, explosion, theft, and glass
breakage.
33. W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 270-71.
34. W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 270. This type of policy can be deceptive since the
definition of a "risk" is vague. Likewise, when an insurer claims to cover "all" risks, which
risks does the company really intend to cover, and will this notion of risks be identical, or even
substantially similar, to the insured's notion of risks? (Of course, this assumes that the insured
wants the notion to be identical.).
35. W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 270.
19891
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contrary to other policies that specify risks covered.
When a dispute arises involving a policy in which the covered
risks are specified, courts tend to give the insured the benefit of the
doubt.3 6 Therefore, by specifically denying certain risks, an insurer
can give a clearer message to the insured and the courts of those risks
intended to be covered and excluded."
An "all-risk" policy also implies that coverage will be relatively
more broad than most individual policies since insurers writing the
latter policy have a more difficult time arguing an implied exception
to coverage.3 Indeed, in order to establish coverage under an "all-
risk" policy, the insured does not carry the burden of proving that
the peril proximately causing his loss was covered by the policy. 9
The insurer, since it is denying liability under the policy, must prove
that the insured's loss was proximately caused by a peril specifically
excluded from policy coverage.4 When filing a valid claim, the in-
36. See also Continental Casualty Co. v. City of Richmond, 763 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.
1985) (insurer cannot avoid primary duty to provide coverage by incorporating ambiguous
exclusionary clause into insurance contract); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hanley, 252 F.2d 780
(6th Cir. 1958) (ambiguous provision should be read against insurer who writes policy); Cal-
Farm Ins. Co. v. TAC Exterminators, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 3d 564, 218 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1985)
(courts must both evaluate provisions of policy and construe them to give the insured their
reasonably expected right of protection); Atlas Assurance Co. v. McCombs Corp., 146 Cal.
App. 3d 135, 194 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1983) (doubts as to meaning of insurance policy must be
resolved against insurer and any exception to the performance of the basic obligation must
clearly be stated so as to apprise the insured of its effect).
37. W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 270. Justice Broussard, dissenting in the supreme
court's decision in Garvey argued:
This principle, which has long been applied to policies that specify the risk...
should be generally applied to all-risk policies where the risks insured are not
specified individually but only as the risks not excluded. To adopt a rule less
favorable to the insured would render the "all-risk" policy misleading . . . . It
is all the more reasonable for the insured to conclude that the purpose of the
exclusion is to exclude losses caused solely by one or more of the excluded
causes rather than a purpose to exclude cases of multiple causation when an
insured cause occurs.
48 Cal. 3d 395, 434, 770 P.2d 704, 730, 257 Cal. Rptr 292, 317-18 (1989) (Broussard, J.,
dissenting).
38. W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 270. In other words, implied exceptions are mani-
fested only in ambiguous language set forth in the exceptions that would specifically exclude
coverage. For an insurer to imply an exception, the insurer faces a heavy burden of proof,
since the nature of the policy is to set forth the basis for exclusion in clear terms from the
beginning.
39. W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 272-73.
40. W. KEETON, supra note 6, at 272 n.15. See British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v.
Gaunt, 2 A.C. 41, 47 (1921), in which Lord Birkenhead remarked:
[W]here all risks are covered by the policy and not merely risks of a specified
class or classes, the plaintiff discharges his special onus when he has proved that
the loss was caused by some event covered by the general expression, and he is
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sured need not prove that his loss was caused by an included risk,
nor the exact nature of his loss, since all risks are covered, absent
any exclusions.4'
However, in some instances, comprehensive policies do contain
gaps in coverage, which ultimately cause disputes between insureds
and insurers. This often occurs when a covered risk and an excluded
risk overlap to contribute to one particular loss.
C. Deference to the Insured
Traditionally, insurance law has maintained an important un-
derlying concept: absent fraud on the insured's part, deference is al-
ways given to the insured when disputes arise out of coverage ques-
tions."2 This assertion has continually been made in insurance cases
regardless of the facts, issues, or conclusions.43 This deference is ap-
plied by the courts in two ways. First, in the interpretation of insur-
ance contracts, exclusions are always narrowly construed and uncer-
tainties are resolved in favor of the insured.4 Second, all specifically
provided protections are construed liberally, so as to afford the
broadest possible coverage."'
The leading case in this area is State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Partridge.46 This case involved a homeowner's
"all-risk" policy containing an exclusion of liability for injuries aris-
ing out of the use of a motor vehicle.47 While driving in the insured's
not bound to go further and prove the exact nature of the accident or casualty
which, in fact, occasioned his loss ....
Id. See also Southern Ins. Co. v. Domino of Cal., Inc., 173 Cal. App. 3d 619, 219 Cal. Rptr.
112 (1985).
41. Gaunt, 2 A.C. at 47.
42. See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co., 268 Ark. 334,
595 S.W.2d 938 (1980); Beaumont-Gribin-Von Dyl Management Co. v. California Union
Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 617, 134 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1976); Stoddard v. "Aid" Ins. Co., 97 Idaho
508, 547 P.2d 1113 (1976) (court would not sanction construction of insurer's language that
defeated very purpose or object of insurance); Brownlee v. Western Chain Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d
804, 393 N.E.2d 515 (1979); Greenholt v. Inland Nat'l Ins. Co., 87 Il. App. 3d 638, 410
N.E.2d 150 (1980); Steinbach v. Continental W. Ins. Co., 237 N.W.2d 780 (Iowa 1976);
American Nurses Ass'n v. Passaic Gen. Hosp., 184 N.J. Super. 170, 445 A.2d 448 (1981),
rev'd, 192 N.J. Super. 486, 471 A.2d 66 (1984) (agreements should be construed against
maker, constructions rendering each applicable contract of insurance operative are favorable in
the law, and insurance policy should be read to afford coverage to extent that fair interpreta-
tion allows); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227 (W. Va. 1981); Petrice v. Federal
Kemper Ins. Co., 260 S.E.2d 276 (W. Va. 1979).
43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
46. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1973).
47. Id. at 96-97, 514 P.2d at 123-24, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
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car, a passenger was injured by the insured's gun, which was negli-
gently modified to give it a "hair-trigger action." '48 The trial court
ruled that the insured was negligent in both modifying the gun and
maintaining control of his vehicle. As he drove off the paved road,
the insured's gun accidentally discharged, injuring the passenger.
The court determined the accident to be covered by the policy.49 The
Supreme court affirmed, holding that coverage clauses are inter-
preted broadly so as to afford the greatest possible protection to the
insured, while exclusionary clauses are interpreted narrowly against
the insurer.5" Here, the insured's use of the car was a joint cause of
the accident, and the other cause, the insured's modification of the
gun, was a risk covered by the homeowner's policy, thus affording
full coverage for the damage.51
Countless other cases have reflected the same notion of defer-
ence to the insured in every area of insurance law.52 Moreover, since
the burden of proof is on the insurer to prove that the damage is
caused by an excluded risk, 8 the insured is relieved of proving the
exact cause and merely has to prove the loss.5 '
D. Proximate Cause and Cause in Fact
Causation is an essential element in any action because it proves
that there is some reasonable connection between the defendant's ac-
48. Id. at 97, 514 P.2d at 124, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 813. A "hair-trigger" action means
that the gun is modified so that it will fire when minimal pressure is applied to the trigger.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 101-02. Justice Kaufman's seperate concurring opinion in the supreme court's
decision of Garvey felt that Partridge should be expressly overruled. Justice Kaufman felt
Partridge was flawed in two ways. First, it incorporated concepts of tort law inapplicable to
the contractual question of the coverage, and based on them, adopted the tort rule of concur-
rent causation to determine coverage. Therefore, the majority's distinction between property
and liability cases was irrelevant, for only contract principles should be applied. Second, it
mischaracterized the causes of the injury as "independant" and therefore misapplied the rule it
was attempting to announce. Garvey v. State farm Fire & Casualty Co., 48 Cal. 3d 395, 414,
770 P.2d 704, 714, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292, 304 (1989).
51. Id. at 102. See also National Indemnity Co. v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co., 95
Cal. App. 3d 102, 157 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1979); United Servs. Aut. Ass'n. v. United States Fire
Ins. Co., 36 Cal. App. 3d 765, 772, 111 Cal. Rptr. 595, 603 (1973).
52. See supra note 36.
53. See generally Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971);
Sincoff v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 11 N.Y.2d 386, 183 N.E.2d 899 (1962). See also 12 G.
COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 44A:3 (2d ed. 1981) ("The burden is upon the insurer to
establish the applicability of an exception, and it is necessarily inoperative when the factual
situation to which it applies does not exist." (citations omitted)); Id. § 44A:10 ("The burden of
proof is upon the insurer to plead and prove that the loss sustained was within the policy
exception." (citations omitted)).
54. W. KEETON, supra note 6 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 29
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tions and the plaintiff's damages.5" As a result, a major issue in in-
surance contract analysis is the question of causation.
Historically, causation has been one of the most heavily dis-
puted and controversial areas of the law. Many opinions have at-
tempted to explain causation, yet none have truly clarified the sub-
ject or even reached general agreement on its principles. 6 In tort
law, there are two types of causes: cause in fact and proximate cause.
Each type of causation must be satisfied in order for liability to
exist. 57
Causes in fact have traditionally been proven by two tests: the
"but-for" test and the "substantial-factor" test.58
Once cause in fact is proven, proximate cause must be shown.
Proximate cause addresses the question of whether the defendant
should be held legally responsible for the damages. It must be proven
in addition to cause in fact.59 This question is primarily one of law.
Legal policy determines whether the conduct has been such a signifi-
cant and important cause that the defendant should be liable. Thus,
the defendant cannot be held liable on the mere basis that the de-
fendant's conduct was a cause in fact of the event.60
55. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
56. Id. § 41, at 264. See also Vinson, Proximate Cause Fog Spreads, 69 A.B.A.J. 1042
(1983).
57. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 41, at 264.
58. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 41, at 265-68. The "but-for" test asks
whether the event would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct, or, that the de-
fendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it.
The "substantial-factor" test is used more frequently when two causes concur to bring
about an event and either one of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the
identical result. This test concludes that the defendant's conduct was a cause of the event if it
was a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the event. The "substantial-
factor" test reflects the law of joint tortfeasors, which recognizes the possibility that each of two
or more causes may be charged with a single result, and that both causes will be held liable.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 41, at 265-68. For examples of cause-in-fact analysis,
see generally Ledford v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 236 Pa. Super. 65, 345 A.2d 218
(1975); Farley v. M. M. Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. 1975); Thomas v. Sarrett, 505
S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Courville v. Home Transp. Co., 497 S.W.2d 788 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973); Stockton v. Longmore, 498 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
59. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 42, at 273. For examples of proximate cause
analysis, see generally St. Louis S.W. Ry. Co. v. Pennington, 261 Ark. 650, 553 S.W.2d 436
(1977); Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978); Mosca v. Middleton, 342 So. 2d 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Mc-
Guire v. Ford Motor Co., 360 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
60. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 41. In most cases, the "cause-in-fact" is the
proximate cause. In cases of multiple causes, the question is more tenuous because there may
be several "causes-in-fact" but only one proximate cause that will determine the liability for
the plaintiff's damages.
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Many theories of proximate cause have been advocated. One
holds that the scope of liability should not extend beyond reasonable
risks.6 ' Another theory would limit the scope of liability to, but not
beyond, all "direct" consequences and only those indirect conse-
quences that are foreseeable."2 Most theories, however, limit their
scope of liability to the defendant's duty to the plaintiff."3 This limi-
tation directs attention to the original obligation of the defendant, his
conduct, and the consequences related to his conduct, rather than to
the philosophical or mechanical sequence of events that underlie the
cause in fact determination.64 Thus, proximate cause analysis could
involve an examination of unforeseeable consequences,65 unforesee-
able plaintiffs,66 and foreseeable risks,67 in an effort to limit liability
to those acts for which the defendant should be considered legally
liable.
The key distinction implied is that cause in fact is a factual
question to be decided by the jury and proximate cause is essentially
a legal question to be decided by the court.6" Unfortunately, this dis-
tinction is unclear as both causes must be analyzed by the "facts" of
the case. A distinction must be drawn between legal and factual
questions in order to prevent questions of law from being decided by
the jury and factual questions from being decided by the court when
it is not sitting in a fact finding capacity.69
E. Proximate Cause in Insurance Contracts
The use of proximate cause analysis can greatly complicate an
insurance contract action, 0 an action brought in tort for the bad
61. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 42, at 273-74.
62. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 42, at 274-75.
63. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 42, at 274-75.
64. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 42, at 274-75.
65. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 43, at 280.
66. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, at 284.
67. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, at 281.
68. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 42, at 273.
69. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 45, at 319.
70. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text. However, in a recent development,
the California Supreme Court ruled that California Insurance Code § 790.03(h) (prohibiting
unfair or deceptive claims settlement practices) does not create a private cause of action against
insurers who commit the unfair practices enumerated in that provision. Shalal v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988). The Unfair Practices
Act prohibits insurers from engaging in unfair claim settlement practices, including a refusal to
attempt a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim, or a failure to affirm or deny
coverage.
The Shalal decision specifically overruled the case of Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court, 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979), which held that a private
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faith of the insurer, and in contract for the specific compensatory
coverage promised by the insurer. This fact was recognized by Jus-
tice Cardozo, who remarked in one case7 l "that there is a tendency
[in tort law] to go farther back in the search for causes than there is
in the law of contracts . . . .Especially in the law of insurance
.. ,7. In fact, insurance law has traditionally concerned itself
only with the immediate, not the more distant causes, and often only
the efficient or predominant, not other more remote causes.73
In California, the Insurance Code has followed similar guide-
lines, providing that an insurer is liable for damages proximately
caused by a peril that is insured, even though an additional peril, not
contemplated by the contract, may have been a remote cause of the
loss.74 However, the insurer is "not liable for a loss . ..[where the]
• . .peril insured against was only a remote cause."75 An accompa-
nying statute provides that "[i]f a peril is specially excepted in a
contract of insurance and there is a loss which would not have oc-
curred but for such peril, such loss is thereby excepted even though
the immediate cause of the loss was a peril which was not ex-
cepted.'7  Unfortunately, the California Insurance Code does not re-
solve the situation in which two proximate causes are responsible for
the damage; where one cause is covered under an insurance contract
and the other is specifically excluded.
F. A History of Concurrent Proximate Cause Cases
Traditionally, in California, insurance laws have attempted to
give deference to the insured when two proximate causes are deter-
litigant could bring an action to impose civil liability on an insurer for engaging in unfair
claim settlement practices. The California Supreme Court held that an action could be brought
by either the insured or a third party claimant, rejecting the contention that the Insurance
Commissioner had sole authority to enforce the terms of Section 790.03. Id. at 885, 592 P.2d
at 332-33, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 845-46.
The effect of the Shalal decision is uncertain to this author in relation to the subject of
this comment. By taking away a private cause of action for unfair or deceptive claims practices,
the only party who could sue for bad-faith within this context would be the Insurance Com-
missioner, leaving a private party without recourse.
71. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
72. See also Squires, Autopsy of a Plain English Insurance Contract: Can Plain Eng-
lish Survive Proximate Cause?, 59 WASH. L. REV. 565 (1984).
73. Id. at 571-72.
74. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 530, 532 (West 1972).
75. Id. § 530.
76. Id. § 532. Note that the California statute contains language resembling "but-for"
causation, which is most commonly equated with "cause-in-fact" analysis, not proximate cause
analysis.
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mined to have caused the insured's loss. Early cases illustrated this
point.
One case, Zimmerman v. Continental Life Insurance,7 in-
volved a policy insuring against death or disability resulting from a
collision with any vehicle propelled by electricity while in or on a
public highway. The insurer denied coverage because the insured
failed to ride his motorcycle at a proper speed, a peril excepted
under the policy. The court held that "when two causes join in caus-
ing an injury, one of which is insured against [under an accident
policy], the insured is covered by the policy."178
Forty years later, in Sabella v. Wisler,7 9 the California Su-
preme Court reiterated this position, holding that an insurer that
had insured a house "against all risks of physical loss except as here-
inafter excluded"8 was liable where the negligence of a third party,
not the acknowledged settling, was the efficient proximate cause of
the loss, even though the policy excluded "loss . . . by . ..
settling."8'
In interpreting the two relevant Insurance Code provisions, the
Sabella court determined that it was incorrect to allow the defendant
insurer to assert that where an excepted peril operated to any extent
in the chain of causation and where the resulting harm would not
have occurred "but-for" the excepted peril's operation, the insurer
would be exempt even though an insured peril was also a proximate
cause of the loss. This erroneous conclusion, the court stated, contra-
dicted the general rule of liability of the insurer where the loss prox-
imately resulted from the insured peril. 8' This test was subsequently
modified and .used by the Garvey court.
In a related case also involving earth movement, Hughes v. Po-
tomac Insurance Co.,88 the court held that, in an action for coverage
of a loss sustained when a landslide caused the insured's house to
slip into a creek, the exclusionary provision denying coverage for
floods or high waters was not applicable. Here, evidence could not
prove that the erosion of the insured's soil by the higher level of the
77. 99 Cal. App. 723, 279 P. 464 (1929).
78. Id. at 726, 279 P. at 465.
79. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
80. Id. at 26, 377 P.2d at 891, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 691.
81. Id. at 31-32, 377 P.2d at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
82. Id. at 33, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 696. See also Brooks v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 27 Cal. 2d 305, 163 P.2d 689 (1945); Hanna v. Interstate Business Men's Acc.
Ass'n, 41 Cal. App. 308, 182 P. 771 (1919).
83. 199 Cal. App. 2d 239, 18 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1962).
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creek was the principle cause of the slide. 4 The court's conclusion
was based on the fact that the higher level of the creek, which eroded
the land around the house and the house's foundation, might have
been a contributing factor in the damage, but could not be proven to
be anything more than a remote cause of the landslide."6 Heavy
rains were shown to be the principal cause of the damage, a cause
not excluded by the insurer.86 Thus, the court, in its analysis of the
relevant Insurance Code provisions, determined that coverage was
established since one of the causes of the damage was covered, re-
gardless of the remote presence of an excluded cause.8
A different analysis was used in Sauer v. General Insurance
Co.8 This case involved leaking water pipes underneath the in-
sured's residence, which caused the foundation of the house to settle,
thus damaging the house.89 The policy provided coverage for the dis-
charge of water, but excluded coverage for damage caused by earth
movement. The court held that "in determining whether a loss falls
within an exception in a policy, where there is a concurrence of dif-
ferent causes, the efficient cause-the one that sets others in mo-
tion-is the cause to which the loss is to be attributed . . . ." This
rule would apply even though the other causes would follow it and
operate more immediately in producing the damage. In other words,
the court must determine which cause started the other causes in
motion, and that cause will determine liability. In that determina-
tion, California courts have found coverage where an included peril
sets in motion a "chain of events" that includes an excluded peril
and ultimately results in the loss.9"
In more recent cases, courts have varied in their responses to
concurrent proximate causes. In Safeco Insurance Co. of America v.
84. Id. at 245, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 653.
85. Id. at 244-45, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 652-53.
86. Id.
87. Id. Another difficult determination of concurrent causes occurred in Gillis v. Sun
Ins. Office Ltd., 238 Cal. App. 2d 408, 47 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1962), in which a docking facility
was damaged when a windstorm broke off a gangway that fell and damaged a dock. The dock
ultimately was destroyed by the waves. The court ruled that the damage done by the water,
though contributing or aggravating the damage, was not an independent contributing or aggra-
vating cause and thus was not excluded by the terms of the policy. The Gillis court analyzed
both causes, and determined that the covered risk, windstorm damage, was coupled with the
excluded risk, water damage, and therefore dictated coverage to the insured.
88. 225 Cal. App. 2d 275, 37 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1964).
89. Id. at 276, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
90. Id. at 279, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
91. Id. at 279-80, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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Guyton,92 a federal circuit court of appeals, applied its interpretation
of California law to a policy that excluded the flood losses of an
insured under an "all-risk" policy, but that covered losses attributa-
ble to the negligence of a third-party. The court concluded that cov-
erage under a liability policy is equally available to an insured
whenever an insured risk simply constitutes a concurrent proximate
cause of the injuries.98
However, a year later, in Premier Insurance Co. v. Welch, 4
the California Court of Appeals reiterated its traditional approach of
determining which cause, an excluded or covered cause, was the "ef-
ficient" cause of the damage. In this case, a landslide and a negli-
gently maintained subdrain were the respective concurrent causes of
the damage. The court held that the negligently maintained drain
was the primary cause of the damage, and that the causal sequence
began with the installation of a sewer line that damaged the sub-
drain by impeding its capacity to release subsurface waters.95 Fur-
thermore, since no problems occurred until six years after the instal-
lation of the sewer line, the court reasoned that the heavy rains were
merely a significant contributing factor, and the subsequent landslide
resulted only because the subdrain could not accommodate the un-
usually large amount of rain water. The Premier court, in holding
for the insured using the "efficient" cause test, conceded that the
Partridge and Safeco cases applied a more deferential test for the
insured's benefit. The court refused to apply the more deferential
test, though they noted that under Partridge and Safeco, a similar
result would probably be reached.
96
G. The Independence of Concurrent Causes
In drafting an insurance contract, the insurer has free reign to
stipulate whatever provisions or exclusions it chooses. Consequently,
insurance disputes often arise from the interpretations of those provi-
sions. In many instances, "all-risk" insurance contracts are drafted
in such a way that the specific exclusions become overwhelmingly
broad in their scope. Hence, one area of insurance contract interpre-
92. 692 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1982). Guyton involved a federal case applying California
law.
93. The italics in reference to "a concurrent proximate cause" are derived from lan-
guage arising from Safeco, 692 F.2d at 544-55 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 101, 514 P.2d 123, 130, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811, 818 (1973)).
94. 140 Cal. App. 3d 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1983).
95. Id. at 725, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
96. Id. at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
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tation has conveyed a different message to insureds. In some situa-
tions involving concurrent proximate causes, the exclusions preclude
recovery for the insured merely by virtue of its wording.
These situations occur when an insured has an "all-risk" home-
owner's policy that excludes from coverage, for example, damage re-
sulting from the ownership or use of an automobile while away from
the homeowners' premises.
Herzog v. National American Insurance Co.97 is a good exam-
ple of such a situation. Herzog involved a man who was killed in an
automobile accident due to the negligence of the other driver. His
heirs brought an action against the insurer under the decedent's "all-
risk" policy.9" The court ruled that the coverage asked for was not
within the reasonable expectation of the insured, that neither the in-
surer nor the insured contemplated coverage for an automobile acci-
dent occurring away from the immediate vicinity of the insured's res-
idence, and neither contemplated coverage for the negligence of a
third party.99
In the Herzog court's analysis, the two causes of the loss were
so independent of one another that an examination of each cause
easily could have revealed that either cause acting alone could have
caused the damage. On this basis, the Herzog court ruled that the
automobile accident was so independent of the homeowner's policy
protection that coverage was justifiably denied.1"'
Similarly, in National Indemnity Co. v. Farmers Home Mu-
tual Insurance Co.,"'1 the court refused to grant coverage under a
homeowner's "all-risk" policy that specifically excluded "bodily in-
jury . . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance, operation, use,
loading or unloading of any motor vehicle owned or operated by...
97. 2 Cal. 3d 192, 465 P.2d 841, 84 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1970).
98. A "tort feasor" is defined as "[a] wrong-doer; one who commits or is guilty of a
tort." BLACK'S, supra note 1, at 1335.
99. Herzog, 2 Cal. 3d at 196-97, 465 P.2d at 842-44, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 706-08.
100. Id. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jones, 139 Cal. App. 3d 271, 188 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1983). The insured, a construction worker, owned a truck which transported steel reinforcing
rods. The pickup truck collided with another truck, killing the other driver, due to the in-
sured's negligent failure in properly fastening the steel rods. The court ruled that there was no
independent, non-auto related act of negligence that could bring the accident within the gen-
eral provisions of the insured's general liability policy. The insured argued that his failure to
load, secure, fasten, supervise, and inspect the steel rods to prevent them from falling out was a
negligent act by the insured and should be covered. However, the court ruled that it would not
have been negligent unless the truck was being used in its capacity as a truck. Since injuries
did occur, the truck must have been in operation. Moreover, the court emphasized that the
reasonable expectations of both parties could not have reasonably contemplated when they
entered initially into the insurance contract that overlapping coverage would be available. Id.
101. 95 Cal. App. 3d 102, 157 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1979).
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the insured ... ."102 The facts indicated that a minor passenger
was injured as a result of the insured's negligent failure to supervise
and control the child while passergers of his car were unloading at a
place far removed from the insured's premises."0 ' The court held
that unless the breach of duty on the part of the insured was inde-
pendent of and unrelated to the use of the vehicle, the exclusion will
take effect, thus barring coverage. In other words, to afford coverage,
negligence on the insured's part must have existed independently of
the "ownership, use, or maintenance" of the vehicle."
This rationale has had similar application in cases such as State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Keenan,10 which involved a contract
for aircraft insurance, specifically excluding coverage during the use
or operation of an aircraft "in flight by or for the account of the
Insured." The court held that this clause did not cover the insured's
potential liability for negligent training of a pilot to whom the in-
sured had rented an aircraft. The aircraft crashed during takeoff
while under the operation of the renting pilot.100 The court's inquiry
focused on the independence of the negligent pilot's conduct from the
specific exclusion, and concluded that the pilot's preflight planning,
representations of experience, and his alcohol consumption before
takeoff were not so independent of the exclusion to warrant
coverage. 07
Another example of the independence requirement occurred in
102. Id. at 106, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
103. This occurred at a location far from the home, which allegedly was covered under
a homeowner's policy. The accident's distance from the house merely exemplifies the indepen-
dence of the causes.
104. Herzog v. National American Ins. Co., 2 Cal. 3d 192, 198 n.4, 465 P.2d 841, 844
n.4, 84 Cal. Rptr. 705, 708 n.4 (9170), states in pertinent part:
The 1968 amendment to section 11580.1 of the Insurance Code, . manifests
legislative agreement with the conclusion here stated: "(g) Nothing in this sec-
tion nor in Section 16057 or 16450 of the Vehicle Code shall be construed to
constitute a homeowner's policy as an 'automobile liability policy' within the
meaning of Section 16057 of said code nor as a 'motor vehicle liability policy'
within the meaning of Section 16450 of said code, notwithstanding that such
homeowner's policy may provide automobile or motor vehicle liability coverage
on insured premises or the ways immediately adjoining.
Id.
105. 171 Cal. App. 3d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1985).
106. Id. at 22-25, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 330-32.
107. "[W]hen the events giving rise to the insured's liability are solely and indivisibly
related to the use of an excluded instrumentality, coverage is precluded." Id. at 22, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 330 (emphasis in original). This would imply that, in other instances where events
were not solely and indivisibly related to the use of an excluded instrumentality, this court's
rationale would allow coverage.
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Safeco Insurance Co. v. Gilstrap,0 8 which involved a comprehen-
sive homeowner's policy excluding coverage for injuries arising out
of the use of a motor vehicle. The insured requested indemnification
for the negligent use of his motorcycle by their minor son, causing
injuries to the passenger of the motorcycle. Negligent entrustment of
the motorcycle fell under the insured's general policy, but the court
held that the parent's negligent entrustment was not independent or
disassociated from the use of the motorcycle itself. Accordingly, cov-
erage was denied.' 0 9
Other jurisdictions have taken a similar position regarding the
independence requirement. For example, in Sekel v. Aetna Life In-
surance Co.," ° the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit decided a case in which an insured died as a result of a se-
vere blow to the head, sustained when he fell to the floor in his own
home. However, the autopsy report stated that the insured's fall was
"probably" due to the insured's heart condition. The court held that
the insured's beneficiaries could not collect under the insured's acci-
dental death policy."'
First, the Sekel court determined that the insured's heart condi-
tion could properly be classified under the policy's exclusion for
"death caused or contributed by, or was a consequence of, a bodily
infirmity or disease."" '  Second, the court reasoned that, even though
the proximate cause of the death was accidental bodily injury, an
included cause, coverage could properly be precluded if the bodily
injury was caused or contributed to by an excluded cause, namely,
the heart condition which the court chose to label a bodily infirmity
or disease."'
On very similar facts, some cases have held that a covered cause
was in fact wholly independent of the excluded cause, thus affording
indemnification for the insured. For instance, in Gonzalez v. St.
Paul Mercury Insurance Co.,"' an "all-risk" homeowners policy
protected the insureds against liability arising from accidents that re-
108. 141 Cal. App. 3d 524, 190 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1983).
109. Id. at 530-31, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30. See also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 406, 191 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1983); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
v. Camara, 63 Cal. App. 3d 48, 133 Cal. Rptr. 600 (1976); See generally Arenson v. National
Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955); Nuffer v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 236 Cal. App. 2d 349, 45 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1965).
110. 704 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1983).
111. Id. at 1336-37, 1343-44.
112. Id. at 1336-37.
113. Id. at 1338-41.
114. 60 Cal. App. 3d 675, 131 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1976).
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suited in injury or death, but specifically excluded damage arising
out of "the ownership, maintenance, operation, use, loading or un-
loading of automobiles while away from the premises.""' 5 The in-
sured wished to recover on his homeowner's policy for his negligent
repair of his vehicle's brakes, which caused his vehicle to hit a pedes-
trian five weeks later. The insurer refused coverage." 6
The court, in holding for the insured, stated that, although the
accident occurred away from the premises in the operation of his
vehicle, the proximate result of the death was the insured's negligent
conduct in the repair of his vehicle's brakes. Since this repair work
was actually done by the insured on his premises, the court awarded
coverage."' Here, the independence of the insured's conduct was
highly ascertainable by the court, despite the fact that the insured's
operation of the car was the immediate cause of the accident. If, in
fact, the brakes had not been repaired negligently, the court con-
cluded the operation of the vehicle itself would not have caused any
harm." 8 In a related case, State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Kohl," 9 a truck driver covered by an insurance contract with provi-
sions similar to the Gonzalez contract sued to recover from his insur-
ance company. 20 The insured collided with a motorcycle, throwing
the driver of the motorcycle to the pavement. The truck driver then
carried the motorcycle driver away from her position on the street in
such a negligent fashion that the conduct caused the motorcycle
driver additional injury. The insurer contended that the insured's
conduct was not independent of the exclusionary clause and denied
liability in the operation of a motor vehicle. However, the court
agreed with the insured, holding that the truck driver's post-accident
conduct, of negligently helping an injured victim, was nonvehicular
conduct, independent of his operation of his own vehicle.' 2' Further,
it ruled that the insured's conduct was not so intimately involved
with the use of his truck, nor was it so uninterrupted or connected to
115. Id. at 677, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
116. Id. at 677-78, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
117. Id. at 680, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
118. Id. at 678, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 628. The negligence occurred on the premises, not
when the driver drove the car off the premises. The accident, therefore, although not in the
vicinity of the home, was caused by negligence done in the home. This analysis somewhat
blurs any distinction between non-auto-related and auto-related accidents.
A more clear distinction would be to assert that all risks in relation to the damage done to
the home should be deemed independent.
119. 131 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 182 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1982).
120. Id. at 1033-36, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 720-22.
121. Id. at 1035-36, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22. See also Spargur v. Park, 128 Cal. App.
3d 469, 180 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1982).
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the operation of his vehicle as to require the finding that his conduct
arose out of such use. Therefore, coverage was not excluded.' 22
As these cases illustrate, courts have occasionally chosen to ana-
lyze questions of coverage by determining whether the covered cause
acted independently of the excluded cause. If so, they will allow cov-
erage for the insured solely under the covered cause of the loss, re-
gardless of the presence of an excluded risk.
H. The Garvey Decision
Prior to Garvey, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Partridge"2 8 marked the last development in the law of concurrent
proximate cause cases in which one cause is covered under a policy
and one cause is excluded. 24 Partridge, an auto-related accident
case, examined the independence of the two causes. The California
Supreme Court held that where at least one covered cause is deemed
to be the proximate cause of the loss, coverage will be afforded, re-
gardless of the presence of any excluded proximate causes.' 25 This
122. Kohl, 131 Cal. App. 3d at 1038-39, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 723-24. The court focuses
on the characterization of whether "post-accident" conduct is the same as "non-vehicular"
conduct.
The court also applied "general tort principles" to this situation, Id. at 1035, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 721, but the language of "substantial factor," Id. at 1038, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 723,
sounds more like a "cause-in-fact" analysis only, lacking any further tort proximate cause
analysis.
See contra dissenting opinion in Kohl, arguing (for purposes of exclusion) any injury
which arises out of the use of a motor vehicle is excluded. Id. at 1040, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 724-
25. This is a much broader interpretation of the exclusion, implying that coverage would be
denied under the homeowner's policy for every accident that occurred after an insured had first
been transported by automobile.
123. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1970).
124. Id.
125. Id. This rationale was followed in Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Rich, 49 Cal. App. 3d
390, 122 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1975), where an injury occurred when a shotgun went off in a truck
while the insured and his passenger were on a hunting trip. The Glens Falls court, following
the Partridge rationale, ruled that the homeowner's comprehensive liability protection covered
negligent acts. The court reiterated the position that where an accident arises "out of the use"
of a vehicle for purposes of an exclusionary clause, it is not determinative of the question of
whether that same accident falls within another covered clause of a homeowner's policy. Id. at
395, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 699. Moreover, the court confirmed the notion that because of the
adhesive nature of insurance contracts, the fundamental principle that all ambiguities in an
insurance policy are construed against the insurer-draftsman must be followed. Id. at 394, 122
Cal. Rptr. at 699.
Thus, the insured may recover if the accident arose from a cause not involving the use of
the vehicle or from a cause concurrent with any cause arising from the use of the vehicle. In
other words, if the damage was caused by a covered cause which was independent of the
excluded cause, liability would exist, and, if the damage resulted from concurrent causes, cov-
erage would exist if at least one of those causes was covered. This would afford the most
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case set the standard for situations in which multiple causes were
deemed to be the proximate cause of the damage, holding that one
covered cause alone would allow full coverage for the insured.
The Garvey"" decision sought to clarify a narrow area of insur-
ance law that previously had been ignored. By incorporating the ra-
tionales of other insurance law cases, the Garvey court sought to give
some guidance to situations in which excluded risks and covered
risks were joint proximate causes of a loss.
1. Facts
The plaintiffs, Jack and Rita Garvey, brought an action against
the defendant, State Farm Insurance, to recover damages that re-
sulted when an addition to their house began to pull away from the
main structure. 2 The addition to the house had been built in the
early 1960's, and the plaintiffs bought this home in the mid-1970's.
As the addition began to pull away, the plaintiffs contacted the de-
fendant believing they would be compensated. After many months of
investigation, State Farm denied coverage claiming the damage was
caused by "earth movement," which was specifically excluded. The
plaintiffs sued on the contract to recover compensatory damages and
in tort for State Farm's bad faith refusal to provide compensation. 2 8
The plaintiffs argued that although their "all-risk" policy spe-
cifically excluded coverage for damage caused by earth movement,
their policy did provide coverage for damage caused by negligence." 9
The trial court agreed with plaintiff's argument and ruled, under
Partridge,180 that the plaintiffs were covered because negligent con-
struction, a covered risk, was a concurrent proximate cause of the
damage. The court of appeals reversed, articulatng a new test.
2. The Garvey Test
The Garvey court, in its analysis, turned to two tests from pre-
vious insurance cases for guidance in setting forth a new test to be
protection and deference to the insured to be adequately and justly compensated.
126. 182 Cal. App. 3d 470, 227 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1986).
127. Garvey, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 470-71, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 210. See also Egan v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1979); Atlantic
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 65 Cal. 2d 100, 416 P.2d 801, 52 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1966); Gray v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966); Los Angeles Ins. Co.
v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 30 Cal. App. 3d 669, 106 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1973).
128. Garvey, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 470-71, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
129. Id.
130. 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal.Rptr. 811 (1973).
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used in determining coverage. The first test was from Sabella,"'
which established that in the determination of coverage, a court
should isolate the single, primary, moving cause that set in motion
any "other" causes or "chain of events" that led directly to the dam-
age. If that particular cause is covered, then coverage will be
awarded, regardless of the presence of other causes specifically ex-
cluded." ' This test proved to be limited because in some cases it is
virtually impossible to isolate the moving cause of the damage.
Moreover, where a long, convoluted chain of events is present, the
characterization of a single cause as the primary cause becomes diffi-
cult. This leads to an inequitable result when a long chain of covered
risks causes a substantial proportion of the damage, yet, in reality,
these causes were initiated by an excluded "primary" cause. 88
This problem was confronted in the Partridge case,134 which
set forth the second test examined by the Garvey court. In the Par-
tridge case, the two causes of the loss occurred independent of one
another, so it was impossible to determine which cause came first or
which one set the other in motion." 5 The Partridge test asks only
whether at least one proximate cause of the damage was covered. If
this is true, then coverage under a liability insurance policy is availa-
ble when a single insured risk constitutes a concurrent proximate
cause of the injuries. " 6
The Garvey court's ultimate conclusion was that neither test is
correct. Instead, the court designed its own test, incorporating facets
of both tests into one. This new test was based on the Garvey court's
interpretation of the Partridge decision, concluding that the Par-
tridge court's primary emphasis was on the independence of covered
and excluded causes " 7 and that this inquiry was only a threshold
matter. If a court determined that'a covered cause of the damage was
independent from an excluded cause, then the Partridge rationale
leads to full coverage. However, if a court determined that the ex-
cluded cause and the covered cause were dependent on one another,
then the Sabella primary cause analysis is utilized to determine full
coverage or no coverage.
131. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1962).
132. Id. at 31-32, 377 P.2d at 895, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
133. This would be inequitable to insurers as well if the "primary" cause which started
a long chain of causes was covered when, in fact, many excluded causes contributed to the final
resultant loss.
134. 10 Cal. 3d at 94, 514 P.2d at 123, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 103-05, 514 P.2d at 132-34, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 820-21.
137. 182 Cal. App. 3d 470, 473-74, 227 Cal. Rptr. 209, 212-14 (1986).
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In addition, the Garvey court addressed another issue in its
newly formed test. Both the Partridge and Sabella tests assumed
that each cause of the damage was a cause in fact of the damage.
This is a major assumption since neither a "balancing" causation
analysis nor an "independence" causation analysis can begin if
neither cause is a cause in fact. This question of cause in fact must
be determined, in and of itself, by the trier of fact before the Par-
tridge or Sabella tests can be applied. 88
Thus, the Garvey court's new test contained three separate
levels of inquiry.18 These levels follow sequentially: first, a cause in
fact analysis is applied to the factors contributing to the damage,
then the Partridge test is applied, and finally the Sabella analysis is
applied. 40 Consequently, in determining coverage, the cause in fact
test indicates, as a threshold matter, whether further inquiry is nec-
essary, thus triggering the Partridge test. If still further inquiry is
necessary, the Sabella test is triggered."
III. ANALYSIS
A. Impact and Implications
The Garvey decision has serious implications for this area of
insurance. An insurance policy is basically a contract for services.
However, when a policy dispute arises, the plaintiff usually sues for
tort damages resulting from the insurer's bad faith refusal to pay the
plaintiff's claim, in addition to an action for compensatory damages
under the policy.
In normal contract analysis, the crucial question is based on the
reasonable expectations of each of the parties. However, because of
an insurance contract's adhesive nature, policyholders are usually
forced to adhere to the terms drafted into the policy by the insurer.
Traditionally, this adhesive nature results in deference to the insured
when problems arise. Furthermore, any ambiguities in a policy are
construed in favor of the insured. The Garvey decision removes this
deference. By forcing a "balancing" between "primary" and "re-
mote" causes, the deference is lost because the trier of fact will be
138. Id.
139. Id. at 481, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (where this three-level analysis was explained in
a diagram drawn up by the court).
140. Id.
141. Compare Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Adams, 170 Cal. App. 3d 712, 216 Cal. Rptr. 287
(1985) (holding separate analyses for the efficient cause or a concurrent covered cause of the
harm as affording coverage).
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forced merely to weigh the causes. Consequently, if the trier of fact
weighs the causes and fifty-one percent of the loss is determined to
be caused by an excluded risk, the "scale" will be tipped in favor of
no coverage. Unfortunately for the insured, the remaining forty-nine
percent of the loss, determined by the jury to be caused by the cov-
ered risk, is ignored. This result could not reasonably have been ex-
pected by the insured. Deference, even at the lowest level of the Gar-
vey test, must be maintained to ensure fairness to the insured.
For example, an "all-risk" homeowner's policy, " " by definition,
insures against all losses not specifically excluded. One reasonable
interpretation an insured could make of this language is that any loss
not specifically excluded is covered, regardless of the presence of
other excluded causes. Indeed, this appears to be the most likely in-
terpretation an insured could make, absent language to the contrary.
Normally, when interpretations of the insured and insurer conflict,
the insured will be awarded coverage because the deference given to
the insured will construe any ambiguities in the insured's favor. Fur-
thermore, deference towards the insured assures all insurance hold-
ers that the insurer will draft fair, comprehensive, unambiguous pol-
icies to prevent any policy disputes from being construed against
them. This also allows both parties to interpret provisions in reason-
ably similar ways, thus clarifying coverage issues when losses occur.
In addition, because policyholders are really consumers paying
premiums for a service, insurance companies should not be allowed
to take advantage of contractual obligations. As a result of Garvey,
large insurance companies will have distinct advantages in dispute
resolution. With substantial resources to investigate and defend a
case, in addition to the lack of deference to the insured, powerful
insurance companies will be able to intimidate less powerful individ-
ual claimants from filing otherwise valid claims. This intimidation
will be especially true of individuals with little money or time for
filing actions, since these individuals would normally rather accept a
lower immediate cash settlement than risk receiving nothing in a los-
ing, and costly, trial. This risk is certainly high to begin with, but
the Garvey decision makes the chances for an individual claimant to
win against an insurance company even lower.
Ultimately, the presence of any ambiguities in insurance poli-
cies will be condoned by the Garvey decision. This allowance will
encourage increased bad faith on the part of insurance companies.
Any time a seemingly minor excluded risk is involved in a policy-
142. W. KEETON, supra note 1.
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holder's damage, the insurance company will claim there was no
coverage, or, at least, it will force the policyholder to settle for less in
the event legal action is taken. Better resources will allow insurers to
challenge claimants on trivial settlements in which the insured would
otherwise be successful." 8
B. Garvey and the Problem of Proximate Cause
Besides taking the deference away from the insured, the Garvey
decision raises some serious problems in insurance causation analy-
sis. As noted previously, insurance policies are essentially contracts.
The failure of either party to perform the terms and duties of the
contract results in a breach. This could be a failure by the insured to
pay premiums or a failure by the insurer to compensate the insured
for a legitimate claim.
A problem arises upon examination of an insurance claim suit.
Assuming the insured files the complaint, the plaintiff will most
likely sue for compensatory damages to recover under the provisions
of the original policy. Such a suit would be an action in contract. In
addition, the plaintiff will also be entitled to sue the insurer for its
bad faith failure to pay the claim to the insured. This will be an
action in tort. What causation analysis will the court use? Concep-
tually, does a court need to analyze proximate cause in a contract
action? Arguably, this is not the issue in a contract case, as contract
actions look to identify a breach, and if so, by whom. This is more of
a characterization problem, not a causation problem.
Of course, the breach must be the "cause" of the damage done,
but contract analysis, in essence, appears to be more of a cause in
fact analysis, not a proximate cause analysis."' Hence, the Garvey
decision creates a problem in its use of a proximate cause analysis in
an action involving both tort and contract analyses. Granted, a prox-
imate cause analysis could be used in the bad faith portion of the
action, but not in the contractual portion.' 5
Next, even if the Garvey court was justified in using a proxi-
mate cause analysis in its decision, it is not clear whether it used this
analysis on the contract issue or the tort issue. If the Garvey court
143. However, "pure" comparative negligence could be harmful in that some plaintiffs
could sue a defendant for damages only minimally caused by that defendant, or caused in most
part by the plaintiff.
144. This view was also expressed in Justice Kaufman's concurring opinion in the su-
preme court decision of Garvey. 48 Cal. 3d 395, 414, 770 P.2d 704, 715, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292,
303 (1989).
145. This approach would probably be tedious and conceptually difficult for most juries.
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used its new test to analyze the damage done to the plaintiff's house,
this implicates the problem mentioned above, the application of tort
causation analysis to a situation involving both tort and contract.
Clearly, the issue of whether to compensate the Garveys for the
damage to their house was a contractual one, falling squarely under
the determination of whether the damage should be "characterized"
as covered or excluded. If the Garvey court was using this new test
to analyze the causation question of the tort issue, this might seem
more justifiable, but it would seem difficult in any circumstance to
discover the "proximate cause" of damage done for failing to pay a
claim, the relevant tort in question.
Perhaps, the real question of proximate cause is whether the
insurer's failure to pay was a "proximate cause" of the insured's
damage. In other words, did the insurer's failure to pay cause any
damages to the insured that would not have been caused without
such delay? In essence, the delay would cause additional damage to
the insureds, and the proximate cause analysis would be an analysis
of the relation between the failure to pay and the additional damage.
Any other proximate cause analysis of the original damage would be
inappropriate.
Thus, the problem of determining which part of the action is
scrutinized under proximate cause analysis must be addressed in or-
der to prevent the court from combining both tort and contract issues
and applying the Garvey test to both. Indeed, the entire proximate
cause analysis, including the Garvey test, forces the issue to be elastic
and vague. One reason for the new Garvey test was to help answer
causation questions in areas of uncertainty previously left unan-
swered. Supposedly, by weighing the "causes" of the damage, and
determining the primary and remote causes, a finder of fact can de-
termine whether compensation is mandated. However, in many of
these cases, the damage is done by an excluded risk in the recent
past, such as a flood, but the damage may not have occurred had
third party negligence not been committed in the distant past. A
more important question to ask would be which causes are the ones
to be weighed, and how far back in time can the jury go to determine
the causes that ultimately caused the loss.""
146. This author also perceives an additional problem for juries: because distant causes
are often incorrectly perceived as less relevant, they are frequently accorded less weight. Even
Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion expressed similar views:
Nor can I agree that such a rule is "workable": to my mind, it is so totally
devoid of standards as to allow-indeed, encourage-insureds always to claim cov-
erage, insurers always to deny coverage, and juries always to decide between
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The Garvey test does not address this problem and without a
proper clarification of the causes that may be used in the balancing,
either party could, theoretically, drum up some ancient negligent act,
somehow related to the damage, and force the balancing. Such an
inappropriate usage of the test will lead to an increased number of
claims, lawsuits, and frivolous actions. Claimants and insurers will
bring more lawsuits if they believe they will have their conflicts de-
cided by the finder of fact through balancing. This practice, over the
long-term, will be more detrimental to the insured than the deep-
pocket insurer, for the deep-pocket will be more willing to threaten
legal action against the claimant. This would ultimately enable in-
surers to coerce claimants into out of court settlement.
If the Garvey test is accepted as the standard test applicable in
this area, how is a jury to decide the issue as a matter of law? Even
if the law assumes each jury member is "reasonably" intelligent, the
ability of a juror to understand the complex concept of proximate
cause is dubious at best, given that this particular concept is one of
the most misunderstood areas of the law, even by lawyers and schol-
ars.'47 This problem is emphasized even more when one realizes that
the Garvey test requires a juror to discover first the "cause in fact,"
then to determine the "dependence" or "independence" of any
"causes in fact," and then to weigh any "dependent" causes to deter-
mine which of the "dependent" "causes in fact" is the "primary"
cause and which is the "remote" cause, and the "primary" cause of
the damage will determine, by itself, whether the insured will be
fully compensated or not. In addition, this entire analysis must be
used by the jury in determining among many joint or concurrent
proximate causes which one is "the" proximate cause, under the
Garvey test. 48
them arbitrarily.
Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 427, 770 P.2d at 724, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 312 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
147. Vinson, Proximate Cause Fog Spreads, 69 A.B.A. J. 1042 (1983). For cases in
which the jury incorrectly allocated liability to each party, and the appellate court overturned
the jury's determination, see Lawrence v. East Coast Ry. Co., 346 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1977)
(Florida Supreme Court requiring that special verdicts were required in all jury trials involv-
ing comparative negligence); Florida E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Lawrence, 328 So. 2d 249 (Fla. App.
1976); Orwick v. Belshan, 304 Minn. 338, 231 N.W.2d 90 (1975); Steinhaus v. Adamson, 304
Minn. 14, 228 N.W.2d 865 (1975); Stapleman v. St. Joseph The Worker, 295 Minn. 406,
205 N.W.2d 677 (1973); Storey v. Madison, 276 Or. 181, 554 P.2d 500 (1976); Krauth v.
Quinn, 69 Wis. 2d 280, 230 N.W.2d 839 (1975); Hands v. Arkon, 489 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1972).
148. This long, tedious, and purposely confusing explanation is merely an attempt to
exemplify what a juror will be forced to understand and analyze when using the Garvey test.
This assumes that a juror will be able to comprehend the concepts of each level of the test,
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Thus, simply on the basis of practicality, it is unfair to force the
jury to apply a test so complex itself, and which is applied in a par-
ticularly difficult area of the law. This problem must be addressed
since uncertainty on the jury's part will lead to unreliable conclu-
sions. This will lead to inconsistent case law and weak precedents. In
all likelihood, the inconsistency of each new case will not be a result
of the variety of fact patterns, but of the varying degree of each
jury's understanding of proximate cause and the Garvey test.
Finally, the Garvey test raises a problem in the potential results
of the proper use of the test. Assuming the jury applies the Garvey
analysis properly, the final inquiry requires the jury to weigh the
causes to determine liability. The jury is asked to determine which
cause was the "primary" cause, and this is done by balancing. If it is
clear that one cause was the "primary" one, then the liability ques-
tion is simple to answer. This would be an instance where, for ex-
ample, the facts indicate that the "primary" cause is ninety percent
of the total loss. Apparently, the "primary" nature of that particular
cause, when compared to any other contributing causes, is so sub-
stantial that the other causes become insignificant. In this instance, if
the "primary" cause is an excluded risk under the claimant's policy,
the claimant gets absolutely no coverage and if the "primary" cause
is a covered risk under the claimant's policy, the claimant gets full
coverage.
However, where the "primary" cause is more difficult to dis-
cover, inequity might result from the jury's balancing. For instance,
when inadequate expert testimony is offered to show any of the
causes is the "primary" one, or when no cause appears to be any
more accountable than any other cause, the jury's balancing is diffi-
cult. The jury might establish a ratio approximating fifty percent for
the excluded cause and fifty percent for the covered cause. Unfortu-
nately, the Garvey test fails to specify the percentage of loss neces-
sary to determine that a particular cause is the "primary" cause of
the damage.
Under the Garvey test, a jury could conclude that fifty-one per-
since the test often confuses many lawyers and legal scholars. Even the California Supreme
Court, in ultimately attempting to rectify the Garvey situation, could not fully agree. Of seven
members on the court, only four joined the majority, one justice concurred with the result but
not with the majority's approach, one justice dissented to the approach, opting to affirm the
"old" version of the court of appeals, and one justice dissenting to the result and the court's
entire analysis of the problem. It is obvious that the court cannot agree on the validity of this
test or of te overall analysis of this area of the law. It will be extremely difficult for lay jurors
to do any better with any level of consistency. Garvey, 48 Cal. 3d at 395, 770 P.2d at 704, 257
Cal. Rptr. at 292.
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cent of the total loss was caused by an excluded risk. Without any
guidelines as to what constitutes a "primary" cause, under Garvey,
this could mean that the insured recovers absolutely nothing. This
conclusion is highly inequitable, considering that the jury, in its bal-
ancing, also concluded that forty-nine percent of the total loss was
caused by a covered risk. The consequences for the insured are that
the forty-nine percent of the total loss that the jury found to be
caused by a covered risk are negated and become non-recoverable. It
is equally inequitable where the jury finds fifty-one percent of the
total loss to be caused by a covered risk, thus, affording full coverage
for the insured. In this case, the insurer would be forced to pay for
an incidental forty-nine percent of the total loss attributable to a risk
the insurer believed to be excluded from coverage.
Thus, the potentially unfair results of the Garvey test's balanc-
ing must be examined. The all-or-nothing rationale conveys an un-
fair message to both insureds and insurers. The result will be that
insureds will sometimes get more compensation than they deserve by
receiving payment for losses attributable to partially excluded risks,
while insurers will sometimes be allowed to deny all coverage to an
insured who has incurred partial losses the insurer was contracted to
compensate for." 9
The Garvey test has many problems. Its application may be in-
appropriate and its results may be inconsistent. Under the Garvey
test, the "primary" causation analysis is designed to characterize one
cause as the moving or substantial cause of the total damage, and to
use this characterization to determine either full or no coverage.
Granted, both parties entered into a contract believing that if damage
were excluded or covered, the payment would be made in full or not
at all. However, in cases where it has been proven that both the
covered and excluded causes contributed to the total loss, it is ques-
tionable that either party expected to receive either full or no cover-
age in such a situation. The reasonable conclusion is that each party
149. The "all or nothing" rationale is similar to the traditional view of contributory
negligence because weighing the plaintiff's negligence can be a negating factor in a judgment.
The difference is that the contributory negligence rationale assumes that both parties contrib-
uted to the total damage, resulting in no coverage for a "contributing" plaintiff, but not the
same result for a "contributing" defendant, since only the plaintiff has this inquiry.
Currently, California follows the comparative negligence standard which allows for a
"balancing" of the negligence of both plaintiff and defendant. See generally Englard, Li v.
Yellow Cab Co.-A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the California Civil Code, 65 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 4 (1977); Schwartz, Comparative Negligence in California-Li v. Yellow Cab
Company: A Survey of California Practice Under Comparative Negligence, 7 PAC. L.J. 747
(1976).
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expected to pay or receive the amount of compensation justified.
The Garvey test ignores this conclusion in favor of weighing the
liability of each risk caused. However, the mere usage of terminology
such as "primary" causes implies the presence of "secondary"
causes, which, in reality, have also contributed to the damage. The
Garvey test precludes consideration of "secondary" causes as mitigat-
ing factors by placing full or no coverage upon the risk that has
primarily caused the damage.15
IV. PROPOSAL
In light of these problems, this comment proposes the recogni-
tion of "secondary" causes as mitigating factors. Indeed, the mere
presence of such factors, concluded by the jury to be contributory,
should be considered and should dictate at least partial coverage or
exclusion for each respective party. This is only equitable since, by
definition, if proximate causation analysis is used, multiple proxi-
mate causes are possible and, therefore, multiple liability should be
possible as well.15' Furthermore, standards should be promulgated
by the Legislature or through case law clarifying the exact percent-
age of causation a "primary" cause must contribute in order to con-
done full or no coverage. Any percentage below that level should be
150. One ancillary problem to this comment is whether the Garvey analysis will require
the jury to assume that the parties involved in the action are responsible for one-hundred
percent of the damage. For example, if the jury concludes that the insured is forty percent
liable and the insurer is thirty percent liable, what happens to the remaining thirty percent of
the damage, which the jury has concluded was caused by some unknown cause or unascertain-
able defendant? On the other hand, will the jury be required to conclude liability by asserting
the percentages based only on the parties present in the action? For example, will the jury
have to conclude that the insured was sixty percent liable and the insurer was forty percent
liable even though the jury believes that both parties actually contributed to the total damage
by only seventy percent? This question cannot be adequately answered by this Comment, but
it appears to this author that juries will perceive, unless by specific jury instruction to the
contrary, that they must apportion one-hundred percent of the liability between only the par-
ties in the named action.
151. See California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d 274,
218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1985), asserting that there can be comparative bad faith actions in insur-
ance cases. This situation can only arise when the insured has performed some act which itself
constitutes bad faith. In these instances, the claimant's bad faith can be a mitigating factor in
the determination of damages, and thus result in only partial recovery for the claimant. See
also Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038,
164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 139
Cal. Rptr. 91 (1977); Houser, Ashworth, & Francis, Comparative Bad Faith: The Two-Way
Street Opens For Travel, 23 IDAHO L. REV. 367 (1986-87). Comparative bad faith claims
most frequently occur when the insurer has accepted its responsibility for compensation but
asserts that the insured has acted in bad faith.
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considered a multiple liability situation in which the "secondary"
cause mitigates either the coverage or the exclusion. 5 These stan-
dards will allow for easier adjudication by the courts since juries will
be required to work within predetermined percentages; their balanc-
ing will be less arbitrary and inconsistent.
This approach will produce more equitable results for both par-
ties since a jury, finding that a "primary" cause is so substantial as
to rest above the designated percentage will not have to consider the
"secondary" cause. On the other hand, if the jury clearly recognizes
that the "primariness" of the causes is impossible to determine, then
the jury will merely weigh the causes and charge partial liability to
the insurer in order to compensate the insured for that amount of the
loss only. This two-phase method is the only equitable administra-
tion of the test because, if the insurer were responsible for every
minute percentage, as it would be under a "pure" comparison, in-
sureds would claim compensation for minuscule amounts of the total
loss.' 5 ' For example, a claimant could claim that five percent of the
152. Proposed Statute § 532.1 provides:
Where concurrent or joint causes of damage have been proven by factual in-
quiry, and one or more of the causes is an excepted peril, and one or more of
the causes is a covered peril:
(a) The jury will assume legal liability for both causes, but the jury will
balance between the causes in regard to the damages, assuming that one of the
conflicting causes is not "de minimis" in relation to the total amount of damage.
(b) "De Minimis" is defined as any cause, covered or excluded, which has
been determined to be 10% or less, in relation to the total amount of the
damage.
(c) If Subsection (b) determines that one of the conflicting causes is "de
minimis", for purposes of this section, the jury will disregard that cause of the
damage, and afford full or zero coverage, depending on the nature of the peril
which remains as the legally liable cause.
153. This would not be similar to the comparative negligence principles that guide pre-
sent California law. California follows "pure" comparative negligence principles, allowing for
recovery even when the defendant is only minimally negligent. In a "pure" comparative negli-
gence jurisdiction, a plaintiff could recover for one percent of the total damage, even though
that same plaintiff was ninety-nine percent negligent for the total damage.
Other jurisdictions that allow for "pure" comparative negligence are Florida, Mississippi,
Rhode Island, Washington, Alaska, New York, Michigan, Louisiana, New Mexico, the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico, the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and admiralty cases.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 11 (Supp. 1981); United States v. Reliable Transfer
Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1978); Walsh v. Zuisei Kaiun K.K., 606 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1979); Bangor
& Arootook R.R. Co. v. Ship Fernview, 455 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Me. 1978).
Some states allow the comparative negligence rationale although not in its "pure" form.
States with modified comparative negligence law include Arkansas (ARK. STAT. ANN., §§ 27-
1763 to 27-1765 (1979)); Colorado (CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21- 111 (1987)); Georgia (GA.
CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1984)); Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 6- 801 (Supp. 1988)); Kansas (KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Supp. 1987)); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN., title 14,J 8 156 (1980));
North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1987)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-38
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total loss was covered and ninety-five percent was excluded. The
claimant would then claim that the insurer should compensate for
five percent. In theory, this would be correct, but in practicality, this
would probably initiate an onslaught of frivolous claims toward in-
surers, and also would motivate insurers to deny claims unreasona-
bly in an effort to decrease the amount paid outright. Thus, by set-
ting minimum balancing standards, the jury will be assisted in
deciding issues that are extremely complex and difficult.""
This proposal would be similar to certain cases that have re-
cently been decided, allowing for comparative bad-faith claims.'
These cases indicate a trend toward weighing the damages, not the
liability, as these recent cases make the assumption that there is lia-
bility on both parties. Thus, because the Garvey test removes the
historic deference to the insured when a claimant reaches the lowest
level of the test, the jury should be allowed to weigh at least the
damages, not the liability, when the probability of adequately deter-
mining the "primary" cause is low. This would remove the "all or
nothing" character of the test because it would assume the multiple
(1987)); West Virginia (Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879
(1979); Wyoming (WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1987)); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-572h (West 1987)); Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31 (1985)); Massachu-
setts (MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §85 (West 1986)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §
604.01 (West 1988)); Montana (MONT. CODES ANN. § 58.607.1 (1977)); Nevada (NEv. REV.
STAT. § 41.141 (1987)); New Hampshire (N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983)); New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 1987)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19
(Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1987)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT., tit. 23, § 13 (1987)); Oregon
(ORE. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1988)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 42, § 7102a (Purdon
1982 & Supp. 1988)); Texas (TEX. CIv. PRAC & REM. CODE ANN § 33.001 (Vernon Supp.
1989)); Vermont (VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, § 1036 (Supp. 1988)); Wisconsin (Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.045 (West 1983)); Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1984)); Tennessee
(Bejach v. Colby, 141 Tenn. 686, 214 S.W. 869 (1919)).
154. In fact, juries sometimes admit that they are unable to apportion the damages. See
Belue v. Uniroyal, Inc., 114 Mich. App. 589, 319 N.W.2d 369 (1982).
155. See infra note 157 and accompanying text. For background on the principle of
comparative negligence, see generally Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 858, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); see also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322,
579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 579
P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
For a discussion of how other jurisdictions use comparative negligence, see 5 M. MINZER,
J. NATES, C. KIMBALL, & D. AXELROD, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS §§ 48:00-48:14
(1988); Ricklin v. Smith, 670 P.2d 1239 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716
F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1983); Scholl v. Babylon, 95 A.D.2d 475, 466 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1983);
Smith & Kelly Co. v. S/S Concordia Tadj., 718 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1983); Simpson v.
General Motors Corp., 108 I11. 2d 146, 480 N.E.2d 530 (1985). But see Kennedy v. Perry,
688 S.W.2d 74 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Circo v. Transit Auth., 217 Neb. 497, 348 N.W.2d
908 (1984); Reeves v. BRNO, Inc., 138 Ill. App. 3d 861, 486 N.E. 2d 405 (1985); Goetzman
v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Adams v. Mills, 312 N.C. 181, 322 S.E.2d 164
(1984).
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liability of both parties, rather than weighing the causes in determin-
ing full or no coverage. 156
Finally, an alternative to the entire Garvey test is the elimina-
tion of proximate cause analysis altogether from the area of insur-
ance. Although bad faith claims are actions brought in tort, thus
warranting proximate cause analysis, the emphasis in insurance law
is on the insurance policy as a contract. Of course, contract analysis
does require some causation analysis. But, the causation question for
the jury should be one of causation in its ordinary sense, not in the
proximate sense. In other words, the jury should decide whether
each risk, covered or excluded, was a cause in fact of the loss. If both
risks are concluded to be causes in fact, liability will be presumed on
both parties, then the jury will weigh the damages in determining
the extent to which the insurer must compensate the insured."' 7 This
method will alleviate the problem of the jury determining proximate
cause and liability, normally legal questions for the court, and allow
the jury instead to decide the factual question of the extent to which
the insurer will be liable to the insured. 58
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this comment is to clarify an area of the law
that has serious implications for insureds and insurers alike. What is
at stake is the welfare of the insurance industry, both to insurance
companies and policyholders. What appears most important is the
need for stability and consistency in insurance disputes. This holds
especially true for policyholders, but uncertainties may also affect
156. But see California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 3d
274, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1985), which reiterated the position that although the duty of good
faith and fair dealing arises out of a contractual relationship between the parties, breach of
duty and ensuing damages are governed by tort principles. See, e.g., Brandt v. Superior Court,
37 Cal. 3d 813, 693 P.2d 796, 210 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1985); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal.
3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
157. This author is aware that the solution proposed will not reduce insurance litiga-
tion. Instead, this proposal is an attempt merely to take away the harshness that an "all-or-
nothing" inquiry could possibly hold for either party. See also Rudelson v. United States, 431
F. Supp. 1101 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Koehler v. New York, 102 Misc. 2d 398, 423 N.Y.S.2d 431
(1979). See Welch v. F.R. Stokes, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Colo. 1983), holding that the
jury should specifically weigh the damages, not the liability.
158. In fact, this rationale has been used in other jurisdictions where comparative negli-
gence is followed. See Herold v. Burlington N. Inc., 761 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 888 (1985); Maci v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 105 Wis. 2d 710, 314
N.W.2d 914 (1981); Purchal v. Patterson, 762 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1985); Brown v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 543 F. Supp. 348 (W.D. Ark.), aff d, 703 F.2d 1050 (1982); Watson v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d 967 (La. 1985); Reed v. Little, 209 Mont. 199, 680 P.2d
937 (1984).
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insurers adversely as well. Stability can only be achieved in this area
of insurance law with clearly articulated standards, preferably
promulgated by the Legislature.
The Garvey decision was an attempt to clarify this area, but its
dismissal of deference to the insured promotes excessive litigation
and unfair results. The reasonable intentions and expectations of
both parties must be acknowledged, and the Garvey test only par-
tially addresses this issue.' 59 Only by modifying the Garvey test will
equity and fairness be maintained for both insurer and insured.
Mark Y. Umeda
159. The dissenting opinion in Garvey expressed similar views. Justice Poche, disagree-
ing with the independence requirement, commented:
In order to comply with its new independent cause requirement, the majority
returns this case for retrial, directing the jury to follow what can only be char-
acterized as a maze-like analytical pattern which may yield an answer as to
coverage or then again may not. While this analysis has a certain pleasing intel-
lectual symmetry to it, I suspect its utility is limited, to say the least . . . . A
less clever, or more conscientious, panel may attempt to follow the analysis in
the order in which it is set out. Assuming they can do so, and assuming the fact
pattern doesn't lead them into the boggy trough of 'two dependent causes simul-
taneously contribut[ing] to creating [a] loss' . . . then they may reach a result
which defines coverage in the largely conclusory legal jargon of independent
concurrent causation or dependent concurrent causation . . . .Indeed, under
the rule set out by the majority, the writing of policy exclusions will become the
most arcane of art forms. The policies so produced will only puzzle the insureds
and engender more bad faith litigation.
181 Cal. App. 3d 929, 947, 227 Cal. Rptr. 209, 221 (1986) (Poche, J., dissenting).

